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Abstract 
A two-stage game depiction of counterterrorism is presented, where the emphasis is on the 
interaction between the preemptive and defensive measures taken by two targeted countries 
facing a common threat.  The preemptor is likely to be the high-cost defender with the greater 
foreign interests.  A prime-target country may also assume the preemptor role.  The analysis 
identifies key factors – cost comparisons, foreign interests, targeting risks, and domestic 
terrorism losses – that determine counterterrorism allocations.  The study shows that the market 
failures associated with preemptive and defensive countermeasures may be jointly ameliorated 
by a disadvantaged defender.  Nevertheless, the subgame perfect equilibrium will still be 
suboptimal owing to a preemption choice that does not fully internalize the externalities. 
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 The Interplay between Preemptive and Defensive Counterterrorism Measures: 
A Two-Stage Game 
Since 1968, the world has confronted an increasing threat of transnational terrorism as terrorists 
either cross borders or else attack foreign interests at home in order to gain media attention for 
their cause.  Transnational terrorism includes incidents involving perpetrators, victims, 
institutions, governments, or terrorists from two or more countries.  Terrorist events (e.g., 
skyjackings, assassinations, or bombings) with implications that transcend the venue country’s 
borders are also transnational.  Recent noteworthy transnational terrorist events include the four 
hijackings on September 11, 2001 (henceforth, 9/11), the Bali nightclub bombings on October 
12, 2002, the Madrid commuter train bombings on March 11, 2004, and the London underground 
and bus bombings on July 7, 2005.  Such incidents indicate the potential damage and anxiety 
associated with modern-day terrorism, which seeks a heightened level of death and destruction 
than the left-wing-dominated terrorism of the 1970s and 1980s (Enders and Sandler 2000; 
Hoffman 1998).
 
     With al-Qaida and other loosely linked terrorist networks, many countries face a threat 
from the same terrorist group, not only at home but also abroad.  When countries are mutually 
targeted by a group, their counterterrorism measures imply transnational externalities and 
associated market failures.  Preemptive actions against the terrorists (e.g., infiltrating a group, 
destroying training camps, freezing assets, or capturing operatives) provide benefits for all at-risk 
countries; thus, preemption represents a public good with strong free-rider incentives (Sandler 
and Siqueira 2006).  In contrast, defensive or protective measures (e.g., erecting barriers, 
scrutinizing checked airplane luggage, and fortifying embassies) may produce external costs by 
shifting attacks to less secure targets (Kunreuther and Heal 2003; Sandler and Enders 2004).  
With the formation of widely flung terrorist networks, transnational terrorism has become a  2  
crucial security concern worldwide.  The enhanced movement of people, resources, and goods 
tied to globalization provides terrorists and their weapons with greater cover. 
  The primary purpose of this article is to investigate the interplay between preemptive and 
defensive countermeasures against terrorism when two countries are threatened by the same 
terrorist group.  Targeted countries’ defensive decisions depend on the level of the terrorist 
threat, which, in turn, is influenced by earlier preemptive actions.  Moreover, a nation’s 
preemptive decision is conditioned on how well its subsequent defensive measures protect 
against terrorist attacks.  Given the common terrorist threat, each country’s preemptive and 
defensive choices are also dependent on the choices in the other targeted country.  Thus, strategic 
concerns involve not only the two types of counterterrorism policies, but also the decision 
makers.  This strategic interplay is captured by presenting a two-stage game where each of the 
two at-risk countries decides preemption in the first stage and defensive responses in the second 
stage.  In each stage, the country chooses its best response in relation to that of the other country.   
  We initially model the preemptive choice as preceding the defensive action because a 
preemptive decision may reduce or eliminate the terrorist threat by decreasing terrorist resources, 
thereby lessening the need for defense.  Most defensive decisions do not greatly reduce the need 
for preemption, especially if the terrorists are determined to attack no matter how well targets are 
fortified.  Today’s fundamentalist terrorists display such determination.  In Section V, we, 
however, show that reversing the stages – defense before preemption – does not qualitatively 
alter our main findings, so that the staging assumption is not driving the results.  
  Most of the literature examine preemptive or defensive counterterrorism measures as 
isolated decisions.
1  Only Arce and Sandler (2005), Sandler and Arce (2007), Trajtenberg (2006), 
and  Poveda and Tauman (2007) allow for both preemption and defense in the same model.  
However, Arce-Sandler’s single-stage analyses do not permit any real interaction between the  3  
classes of counterterrorism policies, because, unlike the current study, neither policy choice 
includes parameters (e.g., cost comparisons) from the other type of policy.  In Trajtenberg’s 
(2006) two-stage model, a central government eliminates any strategic interaction at the 
preemption stage.  Unlike Poveda and Tauman’s (2007) two-stage model, our analysis brings out 
the importance of the inter-stage cost differences in a comparative advantage viewpoint.  
Moreover, we are the first to include foreign interests and terrorist targeting bias when at-risk 
countries decide preemptive and defensive measures.  Our investigation shows that a high-cost 
defender is apt to provide a preemption free ride for the low-cost defender.  This outcome may 
hold even when the high-cost defender is also the high-cost preemptor.  When preemption is 
studied in isolation, the preemptor will be the nation with the lowest marginal preemption cost.  
Our interplay representation shows that the market failures associated with preemptive and 
defensive actions are mutually interdependent.  Underprovision of preemption in stage 1 may 
exacerbate the excessive defense in stage 2 by making for an even more insecure environment. 
 
I. MODEL PRELIMINARIES 
Terrorism is the premeditated use or threat of use of violence or force by individuals or 
subnational groups against noncombatants to obtain a political or social objective through the 
intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims.  Terrorists heighten public 
anxiety by making their attacks appear to be random so that everybody feels at risk.  In fact, 
these attacks are not random and are purposely directed at “soft” targets that institute fewer 
precautions (Enders and Sandler 1993).  This anxiety is also augmented when terrorists attack a 
country’s assets – its people or property – at home and abroad, so that there appears to be no 
sanctuary.  In the latter scenario, terrorism assumes a transnational form that is prevalent today 
and captured by our model.  4  
  We assume two nations – home (H) and foreign (F) – are the potential targets of a 
terrorist group.  In this two-country world, the level and, thus, damage from terrorism is captured 
by T, which can be reduced in stage 1 by preemptive measures (m) by either country: 
(1)  () , T Tm =    ()0 Tm ′ < , and  ()0, Tm ′′ >     
where 
HF m mm =+  and  () ,
i m iH F =  is the preemption level provided by nation i.  Equation 
(1) indicates that preemption decreases damages at a diminishing rate.  Preemption is a pure 
public good abiding by a summation technology – i.e., preemption by either country is a perfect 
substitute against the common threat of terrorism.  As a public good, preemption implies strong 
free-rider incentives. 
  Stage-1 preemption can reduce the terrorism threat by lowering T, but defensive 
measures are then needed in stage 2 as targeted countries take actions to deflect terrorist attacks.  
Defensive measures protect the defender but do not reduce terrorists’ assets (but see Section 
V(c)).  In stage 2, targeted countries thus face a constant terrorist threat T, determined by stage-1 
preemptive measures.  The defensive stage exhibits a rivalry or transference property:  a rise in 
the level of, say, H’s defense will reduce its terrorism while this defense increases attacks in 
country F.  This scenario is appropriate for today’s loose global network of fundamentalist 
terrorists, who will identify and attack the most opportunistic target.  As targeted nations choose 
their homeland security independently, there is a strong tendency to overdefend, analogous to 
overexploitation in a commons. This tendency may be limited somewhat when a country has 
people or property in the other country.  This follows because deflected attacks still put a country 
in jeopardy, but typically by less than a home attack. 
  When two or more countries are at risk, the decision maker in each country 
independently decides counterterrorism measures.
2  We treat each country as having a unitary  5  
decision maker for the two choices.  To capture the sequential decision-making process, we find 
the subgame perfect equilibrium for the two countries. 
 
II.  STAGE 2:  THE DEFENSE GAME 
Using backward induction, we must first find the Nash equilibrium for defensive choices in stage 
2 for a given preemption level.  Let 
H a  and 
F a denote the defense levels of H and F, 
respectively.  An increase in 
H a  reduces H’s likelihood, p, of attack, while an increase in 
F a  
augments H’s likelihood of attack.  The following probability function captures these properties:
3 
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; 10 α ≥≥ , and not  0
HF aa == .   
The α parameter allows the terrorists to have a bias (preference) to attack H.  If, for example, al-
Qaida is biased to attacking the United States over the United Kingdom (i.e.,  0 α ≠ ), then equal 
defensive efforts in the two nations will result in the United States facing p > 50%.  The 
likelihood of attack in F is 1 − p, given our two-country assumption. 
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The first-order partials indicate that self-defense decreases H’s attack probability, while F’s self-
defense increases H’s attack probability. Inequality  11 0 p >  indicates that self-defense curtails  6  
home terrorism at a diminished rate, whereas inequality  22 0 p <  implies that foreign effort to 
deflect terrorism to H increases at a diminished rate.  The cross marginal probability effect, p12, 
is indeterminate in sign.  If, for example, it is positive, then protection abroad raises p1, which, in 
turn, reduces its absolute value since p1 is negative.  With  12 0, p >  greater protection abroad thus 
reduces the marginal effectiveness of home defense. 
  In an increasingly integrated global economy, we cannot ignore that terrorism losses can 
occur at home or abroad, because a target country can have interests (financial and human) in 
other nations.  Over the last decade, the United States was seldom attacked at home (despite 
9/11); however, on average, 40% of all transnational terrorist attacks were against US interests, 
usually in foreign venues (Sandler and Enders 2006a).  The terrorism damage functions for 
country H and F are: 
(4)  () ( )() 1,
HH pT m p T m θδ ⎡⎤ +− ⎣⎦  and  ( )() () 1,
FF pTm p Tm θδ ⎡ ⎤ −+ ⎣ ⎦     
respectively, where  () 0, ,
ii i HF θθ>= represents country i’s valuation of a unit of domestic 
terrorism damage and  () 0 , ,
ii i i HF δδ θ ≤< =  represents country i’s interests abroad.  If 
country H faces a constant marginal cost c
H for its defensive measures, then its stage-2 damage 
function, V
H, equals: 
(5)  () ( ) () () () , ,, , , 1 , , .
H HF H HF H HF H H V aam p aa T m p aa T m c a αθ α δ α ⎡⎤ =+ − + ⎣⎦           
Consistent with the Nash equilibrium, country H chooses a
H to minimize V
H for a given a
F.  The 
first-order condition is:
5 
(6)  () () () 11 0,
HH H H VT p c θδ ⋅= ⋅ − + =       
which can be rewritten as: 
(7a)  () 1 ,
H HH Tpc θδ −− =       7  
where T’s dependency on m is at times suppressed.  The left-hand side of (7a) represents two 
contrasting influences:  marginal defense benefits from reduced terrorism at home () 1
H Tpθ −  and 
marginal augmented risk from attacks transferred abroad () 1 .
H Tpδ   This cost arises because a 
reduced p augments the likelihood of attacks in F.  Country H’s assets abroad temper its desire 
for homeland defense and the concomitant transfers of attacks abroad.  The right-hand side of 
(7a) is the marginal provision cost (c
H) of defense.  This marginal defense cost is higher when 
targets are more vulnerable and harder to defend.  Longer borders and more entry points can also 
increase this marginal cost.  More potential targets raise the amount of protective resources 
necessary to achieve a given level of defense against terrorism, thereby increasing marginal 
defense cost.  Alternatively, equation (7a) can be expressed as: 
(7b)  () 1
H Tpc −⋅ =   
                 () .
HHH c θδ =−   
In (7b), a higher 
H θ  reduces 
H c   because a greater value put on damages at home lowers the 
effective marginal costs,  ,
H c   of homeland defense.  As H’s foreign concerns grow, the effective 
marginal costs,  ,
H c   of homeland defense increases.  By focusing on homeland attacks, DHS 
does not necessarily factor in this risk and, thus, may overspend on defense – a tendency 
augmented by strategic considerations indicated below.
6  Equation (6) implies that H’s stage-2 
Nash reaction function  () ,,
HH R F a aa m =  depends on defensive measures abroad and stage-1 
preemption.  Using the implicit function theorem and (6), we derive the slope of H’s reaction 
path: 
(8)  () 1 12 11 12 11 ,.
HR F H H a am V V p p =− =−   
  An analogous set of steps provides the first-order condition for country F:  8  
(9)  () 2
F Tpc ⋅=   
  () ,
FFF c θδ =−   
analogous in meaning to (7b).  The slope of country F’s Nash reaction path,  () ,,
FR H a am is 
(10)  () 1 21 22 21 22 12 22 ,.
FR H F F a am VV pp pp =− =− =−   
Since  11 0 p >  and  22 0 p < , the slopes of the countries’ reaction paths hinge on the sign of p12.   
  We seek expressions for the reaction path slopes that allow us to sign them based on the 
relative value of the marginal effective costs of defense ()  and 
F H c c   in the two countries.  We 
therefore derive (see Appendix A) the following expression for p12 at the Nash equilibrium: 












This expression implies that p12 ≥  0 if 
H F c c ≥   and p12 < 0 if  .
H F c c <    Using (8) and (11) and 
noting that p11 is positive, we have: 
(12)  11 2 1 1 0
HR ap p =− ≥  () 0 <  as  ()  .
HF HF c cc c ≤>     
This implies that if H’s marginal effective costs of defense is relatively low (i.e., H is a 
comparatively efficient defender), then H will increase its defensive measures as F augments its 
defense.  If there is no cost advantage, then H has no local incentive to react; if, however, H is 
relatively cost inefficient, then H will reduce its defensive action as F augments its defense.  Cost 
effectiveness is determined by c
H being relatively low and H having little interests abroad (i.e., 
H δ is near 0).  Countries whose foreign interests grow relative to other targeted countries 
experience a rising 
i c  and reduced cost effectiveness of home defense, which curtails its 
incentives for homeland defense.  This important consideration should figure into the 
determination of homeland security budgets.  The globalization process can alter countries’ 
defensive actions against terrorism and, thus, their need for proactive measures (see Section III).    9  
  Using (10) and (11) and noting that  22 0, p <  we can similarly express the slope of 
country F’s reaction path as: 
(13)  11 2 2 2 0
FR ap p =− ≤  () 0 >  as  ()  .
HF HF c cc c ≤>     
A comparison of the reaction path slopes in (12) and (13) reveals that these reaction paths are 
sloped in opposite directions unless the effective costs of the two nations are equal.  In this latter 
case, we have symmetric reaction paths with zero slopes at the second-stage Nash equilibrium.
7  
Employing (6) and the analogous first-order condition for F, and substituting for p1 [from (3)], 
we can express the reaction functions of H and F as: 
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,   0.
H a ≠   
Relations (14) and (15) allow us to draw the second-stage reaction paths in Figure 1 for the 
symmetric case (
HF c c c ==  ), except at the origin.  F’s reaction path has a zero slope at the 
Nash equilibrium, N, whereas H’s reaction path has an infinite slope at N.  Nash equilibrium 
occurs where  () 1 4
FN a T c α =−   and  () 1 4 .
HN a T c α =−    Based on (3) and (8), the slope of H’s 
reaction path can be shown to be positive below the 45° line (i.e., for 
F H a a < ) and negative 
above the line.  Using symmetry, we get F’s reaction path.  The iso-damage curve for H at N is 
HN V and is tangent to F’s reaction path at N.  H’s reaction path is determined by the maximum 
values of its hill-shaped iso-damage curves.  Given the tangency between 
HN V and 
FR a , H would 
still choose N even if it could assume the role of a Stackelberg leader, since N remains H’s best 
point on F’s reaction path.  Thus, H has no local incentive to precommit to a defense level  10 
different than its Nash level. 
[Figure 1 here]
 
  We can simultaneously solve the second-stage Nash reaction function in (14) and (15) to 
obtain second-stage Nash equilibrium values of home and foreign defense levels (see Appendix 
B): 
































Given that overall threat decreases with preemption (i.e.,  0 T′< ), the equations in (16) indicate 
that heightened preemption will reduce both countries’ defensive measures.  By abstracting from 
stage-2 deflection effects, we see that greater preemption reduces T, which, in turn, lowers the 
marginal benefit of H from defensive actions [i.e.,  () 1
HH Tp θδ −  in (6)].  Thus, greater stage-1 
preemption shifts H’s stage-2 reaction path leftwards and F’s stage-2 reaction path downwards, 
implying that each country takes less defensive measures for each level of the other country’s 
defense.  Thus, greater preemption in stage 1 reduces the Nash equilibrium levels of defense.  
This is displayed for the symmetric case in Figure 2, where 
21 m m >  and 
2 N is associated with 
reduced equilibrium defense levels compared with N
1. 
[Figure 2 here] 
  An increase in preemption moves stage-2 defense closer to the Pareto-optimal zero 
defense levels, found by choosing 
F a and 
H a  to minimize the sum of H’s and F’s damages:
8  
(17)  ( ) ()() 1 1 .
H HFF H H F F T mp p p p c a c a θδ θ δ ⎡⎤ +− +− +++ ⎣⎦   
In (17), added defense is costly without reducing terrorism damage.  Cooperative defense levels 
are zero because the only role that defense has in our context until Section V is to transfer attacks 
abroad.  This transfer motive disappears under joint maximization.  By shifting N toward the  11 
origin in Figure 2, enhanced preemption in stage 1 ameliorates the overdefense market failure of 
stage 2. 
  
III. STAGE 1:  THE PREEMPTION GAME 
We now turn to the preemption decision in stage 1, conditioned on the Nash equilibrium values 
in (16) for the defensive choice in stage 2.  Preemption is a pure public good, because any action 
to weaken the common terrorist threat curtails the terrorism risk for both targeted countries.  On 
the basis of our analysis, the US “war on terror” beginning on October 7, 2001 is expected to 
provide benefits to all targeted nations.  As a public good, preemption is anticipated to be 
undersupplied.  Moreover, corner solutions are likely where one set of nations take proactive 
measures (e.g., the United States and the United Kingdom) and the other set does nothing.  Few 
nations took active steps to track down al-Qaida operatives or to destroy their infrastructure (e.g., 
training camps) following 9/11.  To capture this scenario in our two-country model, we show 
that the subgame perfect equilibrium has a preemptor and a free rider.  Our basic findings, 
however, do not change when we later relax the constant marginal preemption cost assumption 
and have both countries taking proactive measures. 
  The loss function of country H in stage 1 is: 
(18)  ()() () , ,, , , ,
H HF HH F H H
m L mm V a ma mm c m αα ⎡⎤ =+ ⎣⎦   
where  
H
m c  is H’s constant marginal cost of preemption.  Marginal preemption cost reflects the 
technology, intelligence, and security capabilities embodied in a country’s preemptive efforts.  
Countries with advanced preemptive technologies, sophisticated intelligence, and formidable 
security forces can preempt a given threat at a relatively smaller marginal cost than a country 
without such capabilities.  In (18), V
H is H’s earlier defined damage function in (5), but where  12 
dependency of defense on preemption is now acknowledged.  The first-order Kuhn-Tucker 
condition for the choice of m
H is: 
(19)  () () () () 11 1 2 1 3 0,
HH H H F H H
m LV a V a V c ⋅= ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅+ ≥   
where  1
HH a da dm =  and  1 .
FF a da dm =  By substituting for  2
H V  and  3
H V  [see (5)] and 
accounting for  1 0
H V =  owing to stage 2, we can rewrite (19) as: 
(20)  () () ( ) 21 1.
HH H F H H
m cT p a T m p p θδ θ δ ′ ⎡ ⎤ ≥− − − + − ⎣ ⎦   
  In (20), the first right-hand side expression captures H’s marginal benefits from reduced 
defense, a
F, in country F owing to H’s preemption.  Less defense in F lowers H’s probability of a 
terrorist attack.  These benefits are tempered somewhat owing to H’s interests in country F (i.e., 
through the 
H δ  term).  In (20), the second right-hand expression indicates the effect of 
heightened m
H for given defensive measures (and therefore a given probability of a terrorist 
attack, p).  Increased preemption by H reduces the overall threat and provides benefits for H both 
at home and abroad.
9  These actions also protect country F in the same way – the absence of 
these influences in (20) is indicative of preemption underprovision.
10 
  At an interior solution for m
H, we have 
(21)  () () ( ) 1110 ,
HF HH F H H H
m Lc aT m p p c θδ θ δ ′ ⎡⎤ =−+ + −+ = ⎣⎦    
where we substituted 
F c   for  2 Tp  via (9).  The attack probabilities in the first-order conditions are 
determined by the countries’ relative defensive measures, and not by the preemption decision 
despite a’s dependency on m.  This is established by substituting for a
F and a
H in (2), based on 
their stage-2 equilibrium levels in (16).
11  This procedure yields, 













,               13 
which is independent of m, so that  0. dp dm =   This insight helps to establish that the second-
order condition for stage 1 (i.e.,  11 0
H L > ) is satisfied.
12 
  Country F’s stage-1 loss function is: 
(23)  ()() () , ,, , , .
F HF FH F F F
m L mm V amamm c m αα ⎡⎤ =+ ⎣⎦   
The associated Kuhn-Tucker condition can be written as: 
(24)  () ()() ( ) 21 1 10 ,
FF F H F F F
m LT p a T m p p c θδ θ δ ′ ⎡⎤ ⋅= − − + − + + ≥ ⎣⎦   
where we account for  2 0,
F V =  stemming from F’s stage-2 first-order condition.  The terms in 
(24) have analogous marginal benefit and cost interpretation to those in (20). 
  We are now in a position to analyze the pattern of free riding for preemption.  To do so, 
we first indicate under what circumstances one country will afford the other country with a free 
ride.  Without loss of generality, country F will free ride on H’s preemption if and only if H’s net 
marginal benefits from preemption exceed those of F.  Thus, m
H is positive and m
F is zero if and 
only if  () () 21 0
FH LL ⋅> ⋅= :
13 
(25)  ()() ( ) 111
FF H F F F
m Tpa T m p p c θδ θ δ ′ ⎡⎤ −−+ − + + > ⎣⎦  
                    () () ( ) 21 1.
H HF H H H
m Tpa T m p p c θδ θ δ ′ ⎡⎤ −+ + −+ ⎣⎦   
Based on a series of substitutions involving stage-2 equilibrium values for a
H and a
F, inequality 
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This key relationship hinges on cost comparisons at the preemptive and defensive stages.  It also  14 
involves the countries’ relative valuations of domestic damages, their relative foreign interests, 
and the terrorists’ bias to attacking H.  We can make sense of this expression by considering 
some key cases. 
 
(a)  Case 1:  A benchmark case,  1
HF θθ == , and  0
FH δδα == =  
This case simplifies matters by normalizing the domestic damage valuation parameters 
i θ to 
unity and by eliminating the foreign interests of the two countries.  Thus, target countries are 
similarly concerned only with home attacks.  Moreover, the terrorists display no bias for 
attacking country H over F.  We apply the benchmark assumptions to (26) to give, 
(27)  () ()() () ,
HF FH HF
mm c cT m cc cc ′ −> − +   
in which the tildes are dropped from 
i c   because  1
i θ =  and  0
i δ =  for i = H, F. 
 
Case 1A:  Identical preemption costs, 
H F
m m c c =  
Given identical preemption costs, (27) equals: 
(28)  () () 0.
FH HF c cc c >− +  
Thus, H preempts and F free rides when  ,
H F c c > because H’s net marginal preemption benefits 
exceed those of F.  As the high-cost defender, H has more to gain than F from preempting and 
reducing the overall threat since H is less able to deflect attacks in stage 2.  This is illustrated in 
Figure 3 where MB
H is H’s marginal preemption benefit curve, which lies above that of F owing 
to H’s higher marginal defense costs and concomitant relative inability to divert attacks.  For 
equal marginal preemption costs on line AA (ignoring line BB), we see that  0
H mm
∗ =>  while 
m
F = 0.  Thus, an inefficient defender will preempt a common terrorist threat, insofar as it has  15 
more to gain from a more secure world.  Even for this uncomplicated case, we begin to 
appreciate the interplay of preemptive and defensive decisions owing to cost comparisons. 
[Figure 3 here] 
 
Case 1B: H has lower preemption costs and higher defense cost 
This case extends case 1A by giving country H a comparative advantage in preemption while 
maintaining its comparative disadvantage in defense.  Since 
H F
m m c c <  and  ()0, Tm ′ <  the left-
hand side of (27) is positive.  The right-hand side of (27) is, however, negative owing to H’s 
high-cost defender status.  Thus, equation (27) is satisfied so that H’s net marginal gains from 
preemption exceeds those of F; hence, H preempts and F free rides.  This is illustrated in Figure 
3 where line AA denotes 
F
m c  and line BB represents H’s smaller preemption cost of  .
H
m c   H’s 
defense inadequacies and preemption efficiency reinforce H’s role as the preemptor. 
 
Case 1C: H has higher preemption and defensive costs 
This case is less clear-cut because preemption inefficiency works against H becoming the 
preemptor while defensive inefficiency works in favor of H becoming the preemptor.  As before, 
H will preempt provided that its net marginal preemption benefits exceed those of F.  Based on 
(26) and the benchmark assumptions, H will preempt if the following inequality is satisfied: 
(29)  () () () () .
FH HF HF
mm T mc c c c c c ′ −+ > −   
In (29), the left-hand side reflects the extent to which H’s marginal preemption benefits exceed 
those of F, while the right-hand side indicates H’s relative preemption inefficiency.  If the former 
is greater than the latter, then H preempts despite its inefficiency.  This is displayed in Figure 4 
where the wide separation between MB
H and MB
F and the small difference between   and 
H F
m m c c   16 
fulfills (29).  If, however, the separation between the marginal benefit curves is smaller and/or 
the separation between the marginal preemption cost lines is greater, then F will be the 
preemptor. 
[Figure 4 here] 
 
(b) Discussion of case 1 
The essential message is that the preemption decision critically depends on the relative cost 
advantages (or disadvantages) between countries H and F for both counterterrorism activities, 
associated with the two stages of the game.  Proposition 1 follows from the analysis thus far:  
 
Proposition 1:  With constant marginal preemption costs,   1
HF θθ == ,  0
HF δδα == = , and 
preemption preceding defensive measures, the high-cost defender will afford the other targeted 
country a preemption free ride whenever the disadvantaged defender is not the high-cost 
preemptor.  If, however, a country is relatively disadvantaged at preemption and defense, then it 
may still preempt when it is relatively more inefficient at defense.  
 
The latter part agrees with the notion of comparative advantage that determines trade patterns in 
a Ricardian model.  That is, a country may export a good for which it is absolutely disadvantaged 
(i.e., its costs are higher than the trading partner), provided that its disadvantage in the export 
good is small compared to that in the import good. 
  The United States with its long northern and southern borders and long coastline is a 
high-cost defender against terrorists.  US isolated geographical position does not afford 
protection against terrorists, who can slip through lengthy hard-to-guard borders.  As such, it 
must assume a preemptor role and has done so, especially since 9/11.  As the United States  17 
continues to apply new technologies (e.g., unmanned drones in Afghanistan) to augment its 
preemption efficiency, these efforts will cement the US position as the key preemptor against 
terrorism.   
 
(c) Case 2:  Foreign interests and terrorists’ bias 
To simplify the analysis, we first assume that both countries have the same valuation parameters 
for domestic damages ( 1
HF θθ == ) and also possess the same extent of foreign interests – i.e., 
FH δδδ == − and that the terrorists have a bias α  toward attacking country H.  In this scenario, 












⎡⎤ −− ⎛⎞ −
⎢⎥ >− − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ′ + ⎢⎥ ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦
.  
Consider the case where  0
HF
mm cc −< ,  0
FH cc −> , and  0 α = .   H is both a low-cost defender 
and a low-cost preemptor and (30) is not unambiguously satisfied.  Given the cost parameters, it 
is obvious that the right-hand side of the inequality must fall as δ rises.  Appendix C shows that 
preemption must rise when the nation providing it has greater foreign interests.  Thus, m  must 
rise with δ , reducing the absolute value of T′[note that  () 0 / 0 Td T d m ′′ ′ > ⇒ −< ].  This must 
increase the left-hand side of (30).  Thus, (30) is more likely to be satisfied for higher values of 
δ .  With foreign concerns, H gains an added benefit from preemption by reducing its losses in 
F, which corresponds to   () ( ) 1
H Tm p δ ′ −  in (21).  These foreign losses can limit the incentive 
of a low-cost defender in eschewing preemption.  That is, as a low-cost defender, H may still 
preempt if its foreign interests are sufficiently strong and its preemption costs are comparatively 
low.  A high 
H δ  means that preemption can limit H’s losses at home and abroad. 
  Next, we consider the influence of terrorists’ bias against attacking H, so thatα  is  18 










].  Using H’s preemption first-order condition in (21) and noting that 
H δ  is 
less than 
H θ , we can show that the marginal benefit from preemption rises withα .  As terrorists 
fixate on H, their attack probability is greater for any combination of defensive measures by 
countries H and F.  Thus, an increase in α  shifts up H’s marginal benefit curve in Figures 3-4.  
The analysis implies:  
 
Proposition 2:  For the base model, foreign interests can induce even a low-cost defender to 
engage in preemption owing to losses abroad that cannot be limited through homeland security. 
This tendency is stronger when the targeted country is not a high-cost preemptor.  Prime-target 
nations are more apt to provide preemption, thereby curtailing the importance of cost 
comparisons.  
 
 As a prime-target nation and high-cost defender, the United States has little choice but to 
assume the preemptor role against global terrorism.  In so doing, any country must exercise care 
that its preemptive measures are not excessive or brutal or else negative externalities from more 
grievances and terrorism, not modeled here, may result (Rosendorff and Sandler 2004; Sandler et 
al. 2009). 
  Other interesting possibilities include 
H F θθ ≠ and  ,
H F δδ ≠  whose details we leave to 
the reader based on (26).  Suffice it to say that a relatively higher 
H θ raises H’s valuation of its 
domestic damages relative to F, making it more likely to preempt all else being equal.  Also,  
H δ  augments 
H c   relative to  .
F c    This enhances H’s interest in preemption to limit its terrorism 
vulnerabilities globally.  This intuition also concurs with the United States assuming the lion’s  19 
share of preemptive actions against today’s transnational terrorism threat.  Appendix C provides 
comparative static analysis of the effects of changes in α ,  ,
H θ and 
H δ on preemption.   
 
IV. FURTHER CASES 
Our comparative-statics results explain the behavior of other high-cost defenders, whose 
marginal preemption costs are relatively low.  The United Kingdom has significant foreign 
interests and a long hard-to-defend coastline, which makes it a high-cost defender.  United 
Kingdom’s ability to project power abroad makes its marginal preemption costs relatively small 
compared with most countries.  Hence, its active role as a preemptor of transnational terrorism 
after 9/11 agrees with our comparative statics.  This is especially true when we consider the 
United Kingdom as a prime-target country, second to the United States.  France is in a similar 
position and has engaged in preemption.  Spain is also a high-cost defender with long borders 
and many entry points.  Even though Spain is not a low-cost preemptor, it participated in the 
offensive on al-Qaida until the Madrid bombing and the change in government. 
  Our comparative statics indicate that low-cost defenders with high-cost preemption will 
not engage in preemption.  Switzerland and Austria are low-cost defenders with relatively easy-
to-defend borders and few entry points, compared with Spain, the United Kingdom, and France.  
The Alps limits defensive expense in Switzerland and Austria.  Given their inability to project 
power to foreign lands harboring terrorists, Switzerland and Austria are high-cost preemptors. 
Understandably, neither country joined efforts on the war on terrorism.  Other small European 
countries – e.g., Croatia – are in the same position. 
  Another example involves Pakistan and India, where Lashkar-e-Taiba poses a terrorism 
risk for both countries.  This group is based in Pakistan and has two aims:  a pan-Islamic state in 
South Asia and an end to India’s rule in Kashmir.  Lashkar-e-Taiba has conducted terrorist  20 
attacks in both Pakistan and India, and is believed responsible for the November 2008 massacre 
in Mumbai, India.  Even though India is the prime-target country and a high-cost defender given 
its myriad entry points, it has not taken preemptive actions in Pakistan.  This is because the 
marginal preemption costs of violating Pakistani territory is extremely high (maybe infinite), 
since such actions may ignite a nuclear war.  Surely, Pakistan has much smaller preemption costs 
and, thus, has taken some recent actions against the group to limit hostilities with India.  
Pakistani actions will increase as breakaway elements from Lashkar-e-Taiba attack Pakistani 
interests. 
 
V.  MODEL ROBUSTNESS 
In this section, we alter three key assumptions to demonstrate that the model is robust.  To limit 
complications, we assume that the valuation parameters (
i θ ) are unity, the targeted countries 
have no foreign interest () 0
HF δδ == , and terrorists are not biased toward attacking one 
country (α = 0).   Notation remains unchanged. 
 
(a)  Reversing the stages: defense before preemption  
If the defense decision precedes preemption, then a nation may choose defense strategically to 
influence the equilibrium preemption level in stage 2, thereby affecting the level of terror.  In 
particular, a nation may pick a high level of defense as a ploy to place the preemption burden on 
its counterpart.  Although strategic motives change with this staging reversal, the thrust of our 
central findings does not change:  relative defense cost and preemption cost comparisons 
determine the interaction between the defense and preemption choices.  Moreover, a high-cost 
defender is apt to do the preempting.  21 
  With some algebra, we can establish
14 
(31)  () () 2
FH F H F
mm pcc c c c γ ⎡⎤ >− ⎣⎦ ,  ()
2
0 TT γ ′′ ′ => . 
Since the left-hand side of (31) is positive, the equation is necessarily satisfied if 
(32)  () ()
H FH F
mm c cc c ≤ .  
Equation (32) is a sufficient condition for H to preempt and for F to free ride in the reverse-order 
game.  This relationship is more likely to hold when H is the relatively high-cost defender and/or 
the relatively low-cost preemptor.  If, for example, the nations have identical marginal 
preemption costs so that the left-hand side of (32) is 1, then H is the preemptor if it is the high-
cost defender which mirrors (28).  If, moreover, H is the low-cost preemptor and the high-cost 
defender, them it will preempt as was the case in Section III(a).  Similarly, H will preempt even 
as a high-cost preemptor, provided that it is more disadvantaged as the defender.  In short, 
Proposition 1 holds qualitatively regardless of the order of play.  Allowing for foreign interests 
and terrorist targeting bias will have the same influence as captured in Proposition 2.  
 
(b)  Nonconstant marginal preemption costs and mutual preemption 
We now return to the base model with preemption preceding defense, while assuming no foreign 
interests or terrorists’ targeting bias.  Our goal is to show that allowing for nonconstant marginal 
preemption costs and positive preemption levels for both countries do not qualitatively change 
our core results.  To accomplish this task, we let the marginal preemption cost functions be 
()
jj j
mm c cm = , j = H,F, which are increasing in 
j m .  When m
F = 0, F’s marginal preemption cost 
is relatively low, so that its marginal preemption benefit at m
H > 0 likely exceeds
F
m c .  
Consequently, F is not necessarily prone to free ride on the other country’s preemption, leading 
to interior solutions for m
H and m
F .  22 
  Stage 1 first-order conditions for m
H and m
F are, respectively,  
(33)  () 21 0
FH
m Tp a T m p c ′ ++ = , and  () ( ) 11 10
HF
m Tp a T m p c ′ −+ − + = .  
Using substitutions identical to earlier ones to derive (29), we get  
(34)  () ()
H FF H H F
mm c cT cc cc ′ −= − + .  
If both countries possess identical marginal preemption cost functions, then 
H F c c ≥  implies that 
() ()
H HF F
mm c mc m ≥ , so that 
H F m m ≥ .  That is, the high-cost defender provides the same or more 
preemption as compared with the low-cost defender – a result that qualitatively agrees with the 
free-riding case () 0
F m = .  The low-cost defender stands to get more spillover preemption 
benefits.  
 
(c)  Defensive actions and global terror reduction 
We expand the basic model to allow defensive measures to reduce global terror so that the 
defensive stage is no longer a constant-sum contest.  If hardening a target results in terrorists 
being captured and killed or their assets being seized during an attack, then defensive action can 
yield public security gains to bolster the defender’s private deflection benefits.  Any negative 
consequences to the attacking terrorists make all potential targets more secure – hence, the public 
characterization.  Nevertheless, defender-specific gains are assumed to dominate since any 
terrorism reduction is fortuitous.  That is, defensive measures cannot substitute for proactive 
operations that directly attack terrorists and their assets (e.g., bases and training camps). 
  The level of terrorism is now  () , T TmA = , where 
HF m mm =+ , 
H F A aa =+ ,  1 0 T < , 
2 0 T < , and  11 0 T > .  For tractability, T is assumed to be linear in A, so that  12 21 22 0 TTT === .  
The stage-2 first-order conditions for defense are:  23 
(35)  11 2 0
HH VT p p T c =++=  and  () 22 2 10
FF VT p p T c =− + − + = .  
Compared with earlier stage-2 first-order conditions for defense, there is an additional marginal 
benefit arising from the reduced terrorism (i.e., T2 term).  While this influence creates a private 
incentive to increase defense, there is also a public incentive to free ride on the actions of others.  
This public benefit attenuates the tendency to oversupply defense.  Simultaneous solution of the 
first-order conditions yield stage-2 equilibrium defense levels:   ()
HH a am =  and  ()
FF a am = .  
Stage-1 solutions are similar to the basic model and are not repeated.  Using (35), the  ()
j a m  
equilibrium levels, and the first-stage first-order conditions, we can show that
 
()() () 1 (36) ,
HF FH HF
mm ccT cc cc ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ −> − + Ζ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
   
where  1 >0
H Tp c Ζ=− .  Relation (36) is qualitatively similar to (27), so that the conclusions 
that follow from (27), including Proposition 1, hold with a nonconstant-sum contest where 
defensive measures can reduce terrorism.
    
 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This is the first paper to investigate the interaction between the mix of preemptive and defensive 
counterterrorism policies in a comparative advantage framework when countries confront the 
same transnational terrorist threat.  The analysis identifies five key determinants:  the countries’ 
relative defensive costs, their relative preemption costs, their relative assets abroad, their relative 
damage assessment at home, and terrorists’ attack preferences.  Our two-stage game 
representation shows that, ceteris paribus, the high-cost defender will often provide preemption 
that benefits both targeted countries.  In addition, the prime-target country is prone to preempt in 
order to reduce its subsequent defense spending.  Lower preemption costs are not sufficient to 
determine the preemptor, because high defense costs and/or prime-target status can overcome the  24 
influence of comparatively low preemption costs.  Countries with greater interests abroad have 
higher effective marginal defense costs, which bolsters their preemption efforts.  Moreover, 
countries that place more value on terrorist damage at home will, ceteris paribus, preempt.  In 
practice, prime-target countries with long borders, many entry points, and high levels of foreign 
direct investment are the likely preemptors, a prediction that fits the United States and the United 
Kingdom.  The analysis shows that studying preemptive and defensive counterterrorist measures 
in isolation provides only a partial picture, because the interplay of the two decisions are ignored.  
By relaxing key assumptions in Section V, we show that the order of play, variable preemption 
costs, and terrorism-reducing defensive measures do not qualitatively affect our results. 
  Our study also offers novel insights into the market failures associated with preemptive 
and defensive countermeasures.  Countries that are least prone to oversupply defensive actions – 
the high-cost defenders – are motivated to preempt a common threat owing to their defensive 
disadvantage, thereby lessening the undersupply of preemption.  Preemption in stage 1 limits the 
overprovision of defense in stage 2.  The corner solution that may characterize preemption in 
stage 1 means that the market failure associated with undersupplied preemption is not completely 
eliminated – one at-risk country is still free riding and the preemptor is not internalizing the 
benefits conferred on the other country.  Nevertheless, there is some amelioration of the market 
failure owing to the interplay of the two stages.  Even when both countries preempt, the 
preemption levels are still insufficient owing to incomplete internalization of external benefits. 
  Our analysis demonstrates that effective counterterrorism policy must assume a broader 
viewpoint that integrates defensive and preemptive choices.  This requires much greater 
cooperation between the agency charged with homeland security and that charged with defense 
(Hoffman 2006, p. 16).  For transnational terrorism, this integration must involve 
counterterrorism institutions in all targeted countries. 25 
APPENDIX A: DERIVATION OF EQUATION (11) 
To derive (11), we use (7b) and (9) to give: 
(A1)  12 ,
H F Tpc T pc −−= −    
which implies that  
(A2)  () 12 .
F H T pp cc += −    
Next, we use (3) to substitute for  1 p  and  2 p  in (A2) to give: 













Equation (11) in the text then follows from substituting the right-hand side of (A3) for ()
FH a a −  
in the expression for  12 p  in (3) and simplifying. 
APPENDIX B: DERIVATION OF EQUATION (16) 
Taking the ratio of (7b) and (9) gives: 
(B1)  12 .
H F p pcc −=   
Substituting for p1 and p2 from (3) yields: 
(B2)  12 .
F H p pa a −=   
(B3) then follows from (B1)-(B2): 
(B3)  .
F HH F a ac c =   
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   
Rearranging and substituting for () ,





































To find  ,
H a  we rearrange (B3) to give 
(B8)  () .
HF F H a acc =      
Replacing 
F a  in (B8) with the right-hand side of (B7), we get the formula for 
H a  in (16). 
APPENDIX C: COMPARATIVE STATICS IN STAGE 1 WITH RESPECT TO  , α  
,
H θ AND
H δ  
Suppressing parameters other than α , ,
H θ and  ,
H δ  we can express H’s first-order condition in 
(21) as: 
(C1)  () 1 , ,, , 0.
HH F H H Lmmαθ δ =   
With the help of (C1) and the knowledge that  11 0,
H L >  we have: 
(C2)  13 11 0
HH H dm d L L α =− ≥     
if and only if  13 0.
H L ≤   Using (21), we obtain:  











′ =− < ⎜⎟ + ⎝⎠


.   27 
Thus,  0,
H dm dα >  as required.   
  Similarly, we have:  
(C4)  14 11 0
HH H H dm d L L θ =− ≥  
if and only if  14 0.
H L ≤   Using (21), we derive 




HF F HH HH
HH
a p
Lc a T m p θδ θδ
θθ
⎡⎤ ∂∂ ⎡ ⎤ ′ =+ − + + − ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ∂∂ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦
   
which reduces to: 




















so that  0
HH dm dθ > .   
Finally, we have: 
(C7)  151 1 .
H HH H dmd LL δ =−  
It can be shown that: 




















These results indicate that H’s preemption increases with greater targeting risks, higher values on 
terrorist damages at home, and larger foreign interests. 
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NOTES 
1.  For example, the following papers do not address preemption: Bier et al. (2007) and 
Kunreuther and Heal (2003).  Rosendorff and Sandler (2004) do not allow for defensive 
measures.  In primarily a domestic setting, Keohane and Zeckhauser (2003) consider both 
preemptive and defensive measures as noninteractive choices. 
2.  The model can easily capture the case where targeted nations divide into two groups, in 
which one group cooperates and the other acts independently (see Poveda and Tauman 2007).   
3.  This attack probability function is similar to, but different than, contest success functions 
(CSFs), where success hinges on the ratio of own to total effort (Clark and Riis 1998; Hirshleifer 
2000; Skaperdas 1996).   
4.  We use the convention that  i f  denotes f’s first-order partial with respect to its i
th 
argument and that  ij f  is the partial derivative of  i f  with respect to its jth argument. 
5.  The second-order condition for H’s independent choice,  () 11 11 0,
HH H VT p θδ =− >  is 
satisfied since  11 0. p >  
6.  The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is not charged with protecting Americans 
or their property abroad; hence, DHS efforts to make Americans or their assets more secure at 
home may make them more vulnerable abroad.  Recent statistics on the geographical dispersion 
of US-directed attacks following 9/11 support this vulnerability worry (Enders and Sandler 
2006b). 
7.  This follows from the constant overall threat assumption so that stage 2 is a constant-sum 
game – see Dixit (1987).  This constant-sum assumption is relaxed in Section V(c). 
8.  The first-order conditions for joint optimization can be analyzed to show that we have a 
corner solution at the cooperative equilibrium.  Given that the Nash defense levels in (16) are  30 
strictly positive as long as terrorism (T) remains, we can infer that there is overdefense in the 
noncooperative Nash equilibrium. 
9.  The term  ()
H p Tm θ ′ −  is the marginal benefit from terrorism reduction in H, while 
() ( ) 1
H p Tm δ ′ −−  indicates H’s marginal benefit from terrorism reduction in F. 
10. Given that the cooperative defense levels are zero, the probability of attack between the 
two targets can differ only due to the bias parameter  so that  p is () . p α   With all parameters 
suppressed, the joint loss for stage 1 takes the form:  () ,
C HH FF
mm L Tm cm cm μ =+ +  where μ  is a 
positive constant (given the parameters).  Assuming without loss of generality that  ,
H F
m m c c <  we 
have  0 and 0
FH mm =>  in the cooperative equilibrium (whenever  T′  is sufficiently large as 
m tends to zero).  This means that the nations will jointly assign preemption to the lower 
marginal preemption cost nation.  Clearly, our noncooperative preemption outcome is distinct 
(and therefore not surplus maximizing), because unlike the first-best case, marginal defense costs 
also play a role in determining the pattern of provision. 
11. H endogenizes (16) in its stage-1 decision making owing to backward induction. 
12. This follows from (1), (16), and (21) because  0 T′′ > .  Similarly,  22 0
F L > . 
13. In (25), a positive value of  2
F L  means that F’s net marginal preemption benefits are 
negative, since marginal cost must then exceed the two negative terms representing marginal 
benefits. 
14. Details are available from the authors upon request.  31 
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